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1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) aspires to play a part in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace-
building through civil and/or military operations, through stabilisation efforts, and by building resilience at home and 
abroad. To bring this ambition to fruition, EU institutions have gradually expanded their ‘comprehensive approach 
to external conflict and crisis’ (CA) to become a full-fledged ‘integrated approach to conflict and crisis’ (IA).1  
In their most basic form, CAs seek coordination and coherence in responding to external conflicts and crises by 
adopting a system-wide ‘whole-of-government approach’ (WGA). In their more elaborate form, IAs have incorpo-
rated non-traditional security concepts, variously known as conflict transformation, (non-liberal) peacebuilding and 
human-security approaches. In their most expansive form, IAs may even be understood to apply to external action 
writ large. 
WGAs were introduced to cope with the changing security environment after the end of the Cold War (Weiss, 
Spanger and van Meurs 2010). They refer to the fact that (re-)emerging conflicts and crises, especially those as-
sociated with fragile or precarious statehood, have become multi-dimensional, involving different root causes and 
going beyond the initial nexus between security and development.  
Hence, in order to successfully tackle and address these complex contingencies, a whole toolbox of defence, di-
plomacy and development instruments has become necessary. To employ this so-called 3D toolbox, cooperation 
among multiple actors at different levels (local, national, regional) is required throughout all conflict phases (pre-
vention, crisis management, stabilisation, reconstruction and state-building). 
To respond to security challenges posed by fragile states in its neighbourhood and beyond, EU institutions have 
sought to develop whole of ‘governance’ approaches to external conflicts and crises since 1996.2 The EU’s ‘WGA’ 
policies have gradually evolved in parallel to those pioneered by Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, from a 
minimal definition based on the security-development nexus3 to a full-fledged and ambitious ‘integrated approach 
to conflict and crisis’ that incorporates non-traditional security concepts. The rationale behind the IA is outlined in 
the EU’s Global Strategy (EUGS) issued in 2016 (EEAS 2016: 28): 
“We increasingly observe fragile states breaking down in violent conflict. These crises, and the unspeakable 
violence and human suffering to which they give rise, threaten our shared vital interests. The EU will engage 
in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, concentrating our efforts in surrounding regions to the east 
and south, while considering engagement further afield on a case-by-case basis. The EU will foster human 
security through an integrated approach.” 
                                                     
1 The 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention (EC 2001) was all about the ‘integrated approach’, which shows that termi-
nology comes in and out of fashion. 
2 Even if, in the mission letters addressed to designated commissioners, President-elect Ursula von der Leyen prescribed a 
‘whole-of-government approach’ to the work of the College of Commissioners, the European Commission is not a govern-
ment, just as the EU is not a state. The term ‘governance’ is therefore to be preferred when transposing the WGA concept to 
the EU. 
3 Such a definition would be that there can be no development without security and no security without development. Cf. 
Council of the European Union 2003 and, in particular, Council of the European Union 2007.  
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While EU policy documents of the past two decades have highlighted its commitment to a comprehensive/inte-
grated approach, a few crucial questions remain unanswered: Has this commitment (words) truly become a working 
methodology (deeds)? And, if so, how has it been institutionalised and ‘operationalised’ at the headquarters level 
with the aim of increasing the coherence of responses to ex-
ternal conflicts and crises? 
Indeed, one must ask: Does the institutional setting in the EU 
match the intended purpose of the IA? How have EU institu-
tions overcome fragmentation and silos among, for example, 
trade, development and defence departments? How do they 
set up coherent strategies and joint decision-making pro-
cesses? How much progress has been made in terms of 
fostering effective  
cordination and cooperation? What organisational structures and procedural changes have been introduced to ‘join 
up’ units, divisions, services and institutions?  
This research report intends to investigate these questions. However, it explicitly does not aim to demonstrate the 
effectiveness or utility of an integrated approach on the ground, i.e. the real-life ‘operationalisation’ of EU external 
policy. Cognisant of the limitations of the insights that our research can produce, the role of the EU delegations as 
well as cooperation with and perceptions of other stakeholders on the ground falls beyond the remit of the current 
report, though it is admittedly the subject of ongoing research. 
The research here draws on both desk research and qualitative interviews. The desk research included an analysis 
of primary legal and policy documents, organigrams, annual and other reports on activities, academic literature, 
thinktank analyses and press articles. The findings gleaned from this desk research were complemented by infor-
mation and observations collected during semi-structured qualitative interviews with relevant actors and 
stakeholders at the headquarters level. Stakeholders included, inter alii, staff members of the EEAS (including 
Directorate ISP); officials of the European Commission working for, inter alia, the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) 
service, the DGs International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
(ECHO) as well as the Secretariat-General (SG); staff from the European Parliament; and officials from other inter-
national organisations, such as the UN. 
To answer the overarching questions of whether and how an integrated approach to external conflicts and crises 
has been tangibly incorporated into the EU, the data collected sought to determine: 
1. How has a WGA been defined in EU external strategies and policies? 
2. How has the IA to external conflicts and crises been institutionalised among EU-level actors? 
3. How has the EU’s IA been technically operationalised at the headquarters level? 
In the following chapters, these three questions are investigated in that order. To set the scene, Chapter 2 maps 
the strategies and policies that have conceptually outlined a WGA at the EU level over the past decade. Both the 
While policy documents of the past two 
decades have highlighted the EU’s commit-
ment to a integrated approach, a few crucial 
questions remain unanswered: Has this 
commitment (words) truly become a work-
ing methodology (deeds)? And, if so, how 
has it been institutionalised and ‘operation-
alised’ at the headquarters level with the 
aim of increasing the coherence of re-
sponses to external conflicts and crises? 
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objectives and quality of these documents are assessed, while conceptual influences and exchanges between the 
EU and other multilateral fora are also touched upon.  
Next, Chapter 3 looks into which institutional actors have been crucial in developing and implementing an IA at the 
headquarters level. Rather than merely listing the actors involved, the chapter discusses the coordinating platforms 
and mechanisms that bring together all relevant actors and then assesses them in terms of quality. Indeed, three 
levels of actor coordination are at the heart of this chapter: intra-service coordination within the European External 
Action Service (EEAS); inter-service coordination among the European Commission, the Council of the European 
Union (hereinafter: the Council), the European Parliament and the EEAS; and conflict and crisis coordination among 
the EU and other international actors (i.e. the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the OECD-DAC, the Council of Europe, and 
civil society). Rather than seeking to be exhaustive, this report focuses on the coordination among the most prom-
inent actors involved in crisis response at an EU institutional level. 
In addition to the important coordination mechanisms and platforms under discussion in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 
outlines some of the other instruments, tools and procedures in place to facilitate the operationalisation of an IA. 
On the one hand, the chapter focuses on a new financial instrument that, while still in the pipeline, has the potential 
to foster (or undermine) a more integrated approach to external conflicts and crises. On the other, it briefly assesses 
other important EU-based instruments and procedures, such as shared analysis, trainings and political leadership.  
Finally, the conclusion brings together the report’s findings in a broader reflection of the potential and shortcomings 
of the current institutional setup to implement an IA at the headquarters level of the EU. What’s more, it formulates 
an answer to the core research question of whether the EU’s institutional setting matches its aspiration to take an 
integrated approach in its responses to external conflicts and crises.
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2 Political and strategic objectives 
 
2.1 Developing the Integrated Approach (IA) at the EU level 
The need to coordinate the various entities and policies of the European Union in the field of security and develop-
ment has been acknowledged since the very beginning of the Union’s aspiration to play a role in global politics 
(Tardy 2017: 1). For the past two decades, the EU has aspired to contribute to conflict prevention, crisis manage-
ment and post-conflict peacebuilding through civilian and/or military means. In 2001, an ‘integrated approach’ (IA) 
was introduced in a Commission communication that identifies ‘conflict prevention’ as the most effective effort to 
counter human suffering caused by violent conflicts (EC 2001). 
But the ‘nexus between security and development’, according to which security is a precondition for development 
and vice versa, only took centre stage in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) (Council of the European 
Union 2003). Building on the spirit of structural integration espoused by the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Com-
mission and the high representative for foreign affairs and 
security policy (HRVP), who also acts as vice-president of the 
Commission, further developed coordination by introducing 
the EU’s ‘comprehensive approach to conflict and crisis’ 
(hereinafter: CA) in 2013,4 which was superseded by the EU’s 
‘integrated approach to external conflict and crisis’ (hereinafter: IA) in 2016. However, one should note that the 
seeds of an integrated approach were planted in a number of policy documents in the 1990s and early 2000s.5 
 
2.1.1 Joint Communication on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach (CA) (2013) 
An important step in the efforts to consolidate the EU’s comprehensive approach came with the joint communication 
of the Commission and the HRVP in 2013 (EC and HRVP 2013). The joint character of the communication serves 
to illustrate the common understanding of the CA and the desire to jointly apply the CA. While the document states 
that the concept of a comprehensive approach is not new to the EU, it acknowledges that “the ideas and principles 
                                                     
4 There was a major fight between DG DEV (as it was) and DG RELEX between 2007 and 2010 regarding whose conceptual 
framework for integration/comprehensiveness was going to dominate. While DG DEV has a ‘situations of fragility’ narrative, 
DG RELEX has a ‘security and development’ narrative. The two DGs were then tasked with trying to combine their separate 
versions into a single action plan, and there was even a commitment to try and do just that in the EU’s development policy 
known as the 2011 Agenda for Change (EC 2017b). But significant bickering torpedoed any related efforts, and when the 
EEAS was formed, the idea of developing an action plan was quietly shelved until it was eventually reborn within the EU’s 
comprehensive approach. In 2011, there were also Council conclusions on conflict prevention that encouraged the use of the 
new post-Lisbon arrangements to drive forward ‘integrated responses’. See Hauck and Sherriff 2013. 
5 A first document that hinted at a comprehensive approach at the EU level is the European Commission’s 1996 communica-
tion on ‘The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond’ (EC 1996). 
In 2001, a Commission communication on conflict prevention (EC 2001) introduced an ‘integrated approach’ and identified 
‘conflict prevention’ as the most effective effort to counter human suffering caused by violent conflicts. Finally, the 2003 Euro-
pean Security Strategy (ESS) (Council of the European Union 2003), while not mentioning the concepts of 
‘comprehensiveness’ or ‘integration’, stressed the need for using EU policies and instruments in a more coherent and coordi-
nated manner to respond to interconnected security and development challenges (cf. Faria 2014: 3). 
The seeds of an integrated approach 
were planted in a number of policy docu-
ments in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
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governing the comprehensive approach have yet to become, systematically, the guiding principles for EU external 
action across all areas, in particular in relation to conflict prevention and crisis resolution” (ibid.: 2). 
The communication identifies two core elements of a CA: the coordination of EU instruments and resources, on the 
one hand, and the role of both EU-level actors and member states, on the other. What’s more, it notes that “[c]om-
prehensiveness refers not only to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, but also to the shared 
responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States” (ibid.: 3). 
Four principles underpin a CA: the connection between security and development; the importance of context-spec-
ificity over blueprints and one-size-fits-all solutions; the need for collective political will and engagement; and the 
respect for competence allocation among the respective institutions and services of the EU and its member states. 
More concretely, eight measures are proposed that aim at enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of EU ex-
ternal policy and action in conflict and crisis situations, all of which are accompanied by concrete actions that can 
be undertaken (ibid.: 5–12). These are to:  
1. Develop a shared analysis of the situation or challenge 
2. Define a common strategic vision 
3. Focus on prevention 
4. Mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU 
5. Commit to the long term 
6. Link internal and external policies and action 
7. Make better use of the role of EU delegations 
8. Work in partnership with other international and regional actors 
While seen as a welcome step to further develop the EU’s comprehensive approach – especially because it offers 
conceptual clarifications and a common understanding of the CA (Tercovich and Koops 2013) – the joint commu-
nication also sparked criticism. Overall, while it listed commitments and recommended a number of tangible actions, 
critics argued that the document did not, in fact, provide EU actors with the systems, mechanisms or means to put 
it into practice (Faria 2014: 9; Wilton Park 2014). Indeed, it does not set out very concrete and tangible structures 
and processes regarding who the Union should work with as well as when, where and how (Hauck and Sherriff 
2013).  
Moreover, a number of gaps were detected in the joint communication. While previous EU documents put a major 
stress on conflict prevention, the principal focus in 2013 – given the fallout of the Arab uprisings of 2011 – was on 
conflict situations and crisis management, raising the question of how the CA dealt with prevention (Faria 2014: 8). 
What’s more, the issue of trade preferences, which can play an important role in overcoming instability and crisis, 
is excluded from the text, as are the roles of local structures, processes and government actors in conflict-affected 
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countries (Hauck and Sherriff 2013).6 Another element missing from the joint communication were the relations 
with key international partners in the field (e.g. the UN, NATO, the African Union and the OSCE) despite the fact 
that a specific invitation to build on these partnerships was included in the Council conclusions on conflict prevention 
from 2011 (Council of the European Union 2011). The development of early-warning indicators, for example, should 
be coordinated in dialogue with the EU’s key external partners (Tercovich and Koops 2013: 4). 
2.1.2 Action Plans on the CA (2015-2017) 
Eventually, the Council (i.e. the member states) endorsed the joint communication in its conclusions on the EU’s 
comprehensive approach of May 2014 (Council of the European Union 2014) and through the adoption of subse-
quent action plans in 2015 and 2016/2017 (Council of the European Union 2015, 2016a). Rather than presenting 
something new, the goal of the action plans was to focus on practical examples for CA implementation and feasible 
actions that the EU could implement, rather than forging a shared understanding of CA in the EU (Faleg 2018: 38).  
Accordingly, these action plans discussed a number of cases where a comprehensive approach was being imple-
mented. In the 2015 action plan, the following cases exemplified “different aspects” of the comprehensive approach: 
the Sahel (regional action plan), Central America (Caribbean Regional Strategy on Citizen Security), Afghanistan 
and Somalia. The 2016/17 action plan also listed a number of cases: Mali, Ukraine (regarding SSR), Tunisia (re-
garding counterterrorism), the Kyrgyz Republic and Myanmar.  
2.1.3 The EU’s Integrated Approach (IA) as part of the Global Strategy (2016) 
Stemming from the shortcomings of the CA, the European Global Strategy (EUGS) (EEAS 2016) sought to move 
forward the comprehensive approach by (re)introducing the concept of an ‘integrated approach’. In fact, an IA 
numbers among the five priorities that the EU sets forward for its external action, together with the security of the 
union, state and societal resilience, cooperative regional orders and global governance. 
According to the EUGS, the integrated approach has the following four ‘multi’ characteristics. It is: 
– multi-phased, in that it enables the EU to act “at all stages of the conflict cycle” and to “invest in pre-
vention, resolution and stabilisation, and avoid premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts 
elsewhere” (ibid.: 9–10). 
– multi-dimensional, as it says that it is essential to use “all available policies and instruments aimed 
at conflict prevention, management and resolution”, bringing together diplomatic engagement, CSDP 
missions and operations, development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (ibid.: 28). 
                                                     
6 In fact, trade was mentioned in the 2001 communication on conflict prevention (EC 2001), but it only received very little men-
tion in the EU’s conflict-related integrated approaches since then. In some ways, the 2001 communication was more 
‘comprehensive’ than what has followed it given that it did include trade. 
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– multi-level, as it acts to address the complexity of conflicts “at the local, national, regional and global 
levels” (ibid.: 29). 
– multi-lateral, as it engages “all those players present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution”, 
and it enables the EU to “partner more systematically on the ground with regional and international 
organisations, bilateral donors and civil society” and to build sustainable peace “through comprehen-
sive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships” (ibid.: 
29). 
The section of the EUGS on the IA (ibid.: 28–32) further emphasises the importance of conflict prevention, the dual 
nature (security and development) of the EU’s engagement, bottom-up approaches and the need to restart a coun-
try’s economy in times of peace. 
2.1.4 Follow-up of the IA (since 2016) 
The scope and actions of the IA have been defined in a Political and Security Committee (PSC) working document 
on external conflicts and crises released in 2017 (EEAS and EC 2017a). According to the document, the IA does 
four things. It: 
- streamlines the CA by addressing all the phases of the conflict and describing the EU’s approach to each of 
these phases; 
- operationalises CA by increasing the EU’s impact on the ground, ensuring a coherent EU response and a 
more closely coordinated position among institutions and actors; 
- deepens CA by applying its principles to the full breadth of the EU’s work on external conflicts and crises; 
and 
- completes the CA, by succeeding it as the framework to promote a coherent approach by the EU to external 
conflicts and crises. 
 
In addition, the IA identifies a set of priority areas that are elements of the conflict cycle: 
- Shared analysis and conflict sensitivity 
- Mediation support 
- Security-sector reform 
- EU conflict early-warning system 
- Prevention approach and early action 
- Response to crises (CSDP, civil protection and humanitarian issues) 
- Stabilisation 
- Transitional justice 
 
According to Faleg (Faleg 2018), the practical implementation of the IA includes the following elements: to enhance 
EU capacities in the fields of early warning and conflict sensitivity; to provide the EU with better conflict-analysis 
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and -prevention capacities; to reframe the EU’s stabilisation approach by integrating various political, security and 
development components to make sure that the transition from crisis management to stabilisation is more coherent 
and inclusive as well as by integrating (rather than coordinating) different levels of EU action; and to better link all 
levels of EU responses with other international actors (the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the African Union and other 
regional organisations), thereby ensuring consistency in international-community interventions and effective multi-
lateralism (cf. Debuysere and Blockmans 2019). 
Since the action plans for implementing the CA were viewed as being too rigid, the 2017 working document (EEAS 
and EC 2017a: 4) outlined that the CA “established a process based on action plans and progress reports […that…] 
has been valuable in establishing lessons learned on how the EU could most usefully work in a coherent way.” 
However, it adds that “this process made the system somewhat rigid by the nature of the process and by focusing 
in advance on a limited number of priorities.” As a consequence, under the IA, it has been decided to focus on 
substance rather than process. The 2017 PSC working document also provides an overview of the results the EU 
envisions to achieve by implementing the IA, as outlined according to the particular phase of the conflict cycle 
(ranging from prevention to crisis response to stabilisation).  
The Council’s 2018 conclusions regarding an IA to external conflicts and crises (Council of the European Union 
2018a) called for more concrete and significant progress in this realm. The conclusions welcome that a report on 
the implementation of the IA is included as part of the yearly report on the implementation of the EUGS. Moreover, 
the conclusions point out (ibid.: 3) that there are “strong synergies between the Integrated Approach and other 
follow-up processes to the Global Strategy, in particular with the Joint Communication on Resilience of 7 June 2017 
and related Council conclusions of 13 November 2017 and the work on security and defence.” 
In general, compared to the CA, the IA does not add anything that was not already on the EU’s security agenda,  
and it is mostly compatible with what was laid out in the European Consensus on Development agreed in 2005 (EC 
2006) in terms of responding to conflict. However, it does reaffirm the relevance of the CA and states that its scope 
needs to be “expanded further” by adopting a new cross-sectoral focus on multi-phase and multi-level aspects 
(Tardy 2017: 2). The extended scope of the IA can be understood in two ways: First, it can be seen as more 
ambitious, more political and longer-term than the CA. And, second, it can be seen as more operational, i.e. as a 
means to operationalise the CA. Indeed, the IA has brought about some institutional changes to help operationalise 
the concept, such as the creation of the PRISM (Prevention of Conflict, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform, Inte-
grated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation) division within the EEAS (See Chapter 3.1).
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Table 1: Overview of relevant policy documents relating to CA/IA 
Date Title Document type 
6/3/1996 The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: 
Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond 
European Commission Communi-
cation (EC 1996) 
11/4/2001 Communication of the Commission on Conflict Preven-
tion 
European Commission Communi-
cation (EC 2001) 
8/12/2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) Strategic Document (Council of Eu-
ropean Union 2003) 
11/12/2013  The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts 
and crises 
Joint Communication (EC and 
HRVP 2013) 
12/5/2014  Council conclusions on the EU’s comprehensive ap-
proach 
Council of the European Union Con-
clusions (Council of the European 
Union 2014) 
10/4/2015  Taking forward the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to 
external conflicts and crises – Action Plan 2015 
Joint Staff Working Document 
(Council of the European Union 
2015) 
2/6/2016 EU Global Strategy Strategic Document (EEAS 2016) 
19/7/2016  Taking forward the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to 
external conflicts and crises – Action Plan 2016/2017 
Joint Staff Working Document 
(Council of the European Union 
2016a) 
19/7/2016  Progress Report on the implementation of the EU’s 
Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and cri-
ses – Action Plan 2015 
Joint Staff Working Document 
(Council of the European Union 
2016b) 
7/6/2017 A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU’s External 
Action 
Joint Communication (EC and 
HRVP 2017) 
14/6/2017 The EU Integrated Approach to external conflicts and 
crises 
EEAS/Commission services Issues 
Paper for PSC (EEAS and EC 
2017a) 
8/12/2017 Parameters for a concept on Stabilisation as part of the 
EU Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crises 
EEAS/Commission services Issues 
Paper (EEAS and EC 2017b) 
22/1/2018 Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to Ex-
ternal Conflicts and Crises 
Council of the European Union Con-
clusions (Council of the European 
Union 2018a) 
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2.2 International actors’ conceptual impact on the EU’s IA 
Other multilateral actors (e.g. the UN, NATO and the OSCE) have been developing WGAs in parallel to the EU 
(Debuysere and Blockmans 2019). This has inevitably led to conceptual exchanges and interactions among these 
organisations.  
The United Nations does not consider itself a pioneer in setting up a WGA, and it claims that it has much to learn 
from the EU (interview UNLOPS, May 2019; interview EC Sec-Gen, May 2019). As a fully intergovernmental or-
ganisation with 193 member states (and two observer states), it is indeed a challenge for the UN to forge enhanced 
coordination. Nonetheless, the UN has a long history of implementing a WGA to external conflicts.  
In conceptual terms, the 1992 ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (UN 1992) was the first serious attempt to generate a greater 
sense of unity in conflict-cycle management, placing the United Nations front and centre in the international com-
munity’s efforts to prevent, manage and durably resolve armed conflict in line with the basic principles laid down in 
both the UN’s Charter and human rights covenants. In response to the need felt in Africa, the Balkans and else-
where to run increasingly large and multi-dimensional peace-support operations (Gelot 2016), the UN Secretariat 
of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) were created. 
This first stab at ‘structural’ integration was followed by an attempt at ‘strategic’ integration. Based in part on the 
lessons learned from peacekeeping failures in the late 1990s and early 2000s (de Coning 2008), the ‘strategic’ 
integration drive encapsulated in the Brahimi Report promoted the idea that all UN entities, agencies, funds and 
programmes should cooperate under a single UN flag so as to maximise the impact of their collective resources 
(Joops et al. 2015).
 
An analysis of the weaknesses of and obstacles to integration led the Panel on the United 
Nations Peace Operations to recommend the formation of an ‘integrated mission task force’, i.e. an integrated 
headquarters-level response to be developed at the earliest stages of the process of crisis-response planning that 
brings together different departments of the UN Secretariat (DPKO, DPA, OCHA), agencies, funds and pro-
grammes (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR) for mission-specific support.  
An ‘integrated mission concept’ was pioneered for Kosovo in 1999 in order to ensure an effective division of labour 
among the various actors on the ground (Eide et al. 2005; Weir 2006). In operational terms, the main innovation of 
the integrated mission concept was that the functions of the resident coordinator (RC) and the humanitarian coor-
dinator (HC) were morphed into the mandate of a deputy special representative of the secretary-general (DSRSG). 
This double-hatting allowed the DSRSG to better represent the humanitarian and development dimensions in plan-
ning, coordinating, managing and evaluating the mission. UN entities on the ground – including mission 
components, the UN country team and specialised agencies – were technically distinct but brought under the same 
leadership.  
Guidelines for an ‘integrated mission planning process’ (IMPP) became operational as of 2008, when the broader 
and more strategic ‘integrated approach’ was adopted under the leadership of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (UN 
2008). This approach recognised that integration requires a system-wide process whereby all different dimensions 
and relevant UN agents – as well as the Bretton Woods institutions (i.e. the International Monetary Fund and the 
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World Bank Group) – should act in a synchronised, sequenced and coherent fashion, with all operating as a single 
integrated UN system at the country level and in a coordinated fashion with extra-UN actors. In other words, the 
approach called for ‘effective multilateralism’ within and outside the UN family. 
A new push for the UN’s integrated approach has been catalysed by the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development in 2015 (UN 2015) and the report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations (HIPPO) (HIPPO 2015). The HIPPO report recommended ways of achieving the full potential of UN 
operations. These included strengthened early-warning, analysis, strategy and planning mechanisms, which to-
gether would bolster conflict sensitivity in order to design missions better and to be able to respond flexibly to 
changing needs on the ground, as well as a renewed emphasis on investing in capacities and local ownership to 
play a more preventive and inclusive role in addressing emerging crises.  
Launched by Secretary-General António Guterres, the institutional reform process of the UN peace and security 
pillar has recently been concluded and may provide inspiration for EU actors. As one of three significant reforms 
(in peace and security, development and management), a main 
goal of the UN peace and security reforms is to foster increased 
subsidiarity. By delegating authority and accountability closer to 
the field rather than keeping it at the headquarters level, the UN 
hopes to make its crisis response quicker and more effective. One 
core innovation at the headquarters level has been to merge the 
geographical divisions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political 
Affairs (DPA) as well as the corresponding tasks at the level of the assistant under-secretary-general.7 
According to interviewees at Directorate ISP and DG DEVCO (interview EEAS and European Commission, April 
2019), the UN is now doing a better job on the ground at connecting the political and the operational dimensions of 
its actions. This has led to the fact that two more development-oriented agencies (i.e. UNICEF and the UNDP) also 
use political insights in their actions. In contrast to the UN, the EU struggles to join up the political and ‘operational’ 
(i.e. CSDP ‘conduct’) sides of the EEAS. This is mainly due to two factors: (1) legal hurdles presented by the current 
treaty framework and (2) an imbalance between development staff (50+ members) and political staff (only a handful 
of people) in its delegations (e.g. in Ethiopia).  
At an earlier stage, the EU had drawn inspiration from NATO attempts to combine civilian and military aspects of 
conflict management. In the early 2000s, the Council introduced two cornerstone concepts that reflected its desire 
for a comprehensive/integrated approach: CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) at the tactical level and CMCO (civilian-
military coordination) at the political, strategic and institutional levels. While the former is a military doctrine adopted 
in 2002 (and modelled on NATO’s analogous concept), the latter is an internal concept adopted in 2003 (Faleg 
2018).  
                                                     
7 The creation of a UN Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund was also an attempt to have a more holistic re-
sponse to the conflict cycle, but it was not an uncontroversial one. Several member countries saw conflict issues as being the 
domain of the Security Council, while development concerns were mainly dealt with by specialist agencies. Developing coun-
tries, in particular, but also China and Russia, were very suspicious about whether further ‘integration’ could result in a loss of 
political steering and control as well as unwanted meddling in internal political affairs (cf. Tomat and Onestini 2010). 
The institutional reform process of the 
UN peace and security pillar has re-
cently been concluded and may 
provide inspiration for EU actors. 
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The 2006 Riga Summit Declaration (NATO 2006) was the first official NATO document to refer to the alliance’s so-
called comprehensive approach to ‘out of area’ conflicts and crises. Drawing on experiences in Afghanistan and 
Kosovo, NATO’s comprehensive approach was conceived of as a way to respond better to crises by involving a 
wide spectrum of civil and military instruments while fully respecting the mandates and decision-making autonomy 
of all parties involved. As the need for proper mechanisms of cooperation with other international actors and civilian 
agencies was considered particularly acute at the early planning stage of an operation, NATO adapted its opera-
tional planning to improve support for civilian reconstruction and development (Gheciu 2012). Developing closer 
ties with the EU, the UN and other international organisations constituted a critical part of this approach, as a better 
division of mandates would help NATO to perform better in theatre.  
NATO’s Strategic Concept of 2010 (NATO 2010: 19) affirmed that the alliance would engage “where possible and 
when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction”, 
and that a “comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management.” 
The strategic concept called for NATO to enhance intelligence-sharing within the organisation, intensify political 
consultations among allies, form a civilian crisis-management capability to liaise more effectively with civilian part-
ners, improve integrated civilian-military planning, and develop the capability to train local forces in crisis zones 
(ibid.: 21). A plan was developed to stimulate the transformation of NATO’s military mindset into a comprehensive 
modus operandi with a clear emphasis on effective multilateralism both within and outside the organisation as well 
as combined with local ownership. 
Against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving security environment, the 2016 Warsaw Summit called for a review of 
the strategic concept and an action plan with new elements for conflict prevention, countering hybrid threats, cy-
bersecurity and operational cooperation at sea and on migration. Based on a joint declaration of 10 July 2016 
(NATO 2016a), 42 concrete actions for the implementation in the afore-mentioned areas were developed to en-
hance NATO-EU cooperation. In December 2017 (NATO 2017), an additional set of 34 actions was endorsed, 
including on three new topics: counterterrorism; military mobility; women, peace and security.  
These efforts at generating more complementarity and effective multilateralism have contributed to improving 
NATO’s own conflict sensitivity, internal organisation and crisis-management instruments. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that the military culture remains overwhelmingly predominant in the alliance, and that, in theatre, NATO 
remains the primus inter pares in terms of supporting or undertaking military engagement in crisis situations. 
The comprehensive approach to ‘in area’ conflicts and crises of the OSCE is rooted in its core mandate as a forum 
for political and security dialogue among members, and it has been fully embodied in the organisation’s joint actions 
since its creation. The comprehensive approach emanates from the three ‘baskets’ of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act 
(OSCE 1975) : the politico-military, the economic-environmental, and the human dimensions. The approach pre-
sumes a direct relationship between peace, stability and wealth, on the one hand, and the values of democratic 
institutions, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the development of a market economy, on the other.  
The principle of the ‘indivisibility’ of the comprehensive approach implies that an increase in security for some 
participating states should not be detrimental to the security of other states. The notion of ‘cooperative security’ (a 
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variant of the principle of ‘effective multilateralism’) is also central to the OSCE’s operational rationale, and it aims 
at the prevention of security threats and zero-sum games rather than efforts to counter them. The OSCE builds on 
the acceptance of binding commitments that limit military capabilities and actions through confidence-building and 
reassurance measures. Over time, these values and strategic principles have been reiterated and reinforced via a 
series of documents, including the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe (OSCE 1990), the 1999 Charter for 
European Security (OSCE 1999), and the 2003 OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 
Twenty-First Century (OSCE 2003). 
Reinforcing comprehensive action along the strands of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict 
rehabilitation, the OSCE addresses challenges that pose a threat across borders, such as climate change, terror-
ism, radicalisation and violent extremism, organised crime, cyber-crime and trafficking of all kinds. In its cross-
dimensional activities, the OSCE starts from virtually the same value-base as the UN and the EU to work towards 
gender equality, engage with local youth across the peace and security agenda, and promote comprehensive ap-
proaches to managing migration and refugee flows. For example, in a 2018 press release regarding enhanced EU-
OSCE cooperation, the EEAS wrote (EEAS 2018): “The EU, like the OSCE, addresses security in a comprehensive 
manner […] from conflict prevention, mediation and cross-border cooperation, to respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; from the promotion of the rule of law and democracy, to strengthening States’ resilience to 
trans-national threats.” 
OSCE institutions include the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on 
National Minorities, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media. The respect which these institutions com-
mand across Europe shows that the OSCE can work effectively on issues for which members states have 
transferred power to it. In other fields, even though a values-based and comprehensive approach to cooperative 
security is in its DNA, the organisation suffers from significant operational limitations. This is mainly due to seven 
factors: (1) the different priorities for and perspectives on European security of the participating states; (2) the 
negative attitudes of a number of participating states about the organisation; (3) the consensus-building nature of 
the organisation, which is laborious and time-consuming; (4) the absence of effective mechanisms to sanction 
violations of the body’s core principles; (5) limited resources; (6) the lack of clear implementation criteria for its wide 
range of activities; and (7) the disparate ways and means for implementing lessons learned and (self-)assessment.  
In an effort to enhance its ‘conflict-sensitive’ approach to crises (our term), the 2011 Vilnius Ministerial Council 
called for enhanced coordination to strengthen the OSCE’s analysis, assessment and engagement capacities in all 
phases of the conflict cycle (OSCE 2011). This led to a consolidation of the organisation’s early-warning capacity 
and resources; the creation of a systematic mediation-support capacity within the Conflict Prevention Centre; the 
adoption of guidance materials on dialogue facilitation, taking on the UN principles of active mediation; and the 
creation of a rapid-deployment roster. Capacity-building for the comprehensive approach was accelerated by the 
deployment of an OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine in 2014. However, despite these changes 
and efforts, many of these capacities remain in suspended animation. Since the eve of the 40th anniversary of the 
Helsinki Final Act (OSCE 1975), Russia has violated Ukraine’s borders, territorial integrity and freedom from non-
interference in domestic affairs, thereby shaking the very foundations of European security on which the OSCE 
rests and ignoring the monitoring mission’s observations.
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Finally, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) has been quite important in setting the 
whole WGA agenda in the EU (interview DEVCO, April 2019). The EU and its member states regularly cooperate 
with the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), a subsidiary body of the OECD-DAC, which brings 
together DAC members and key multilateral agencies working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This forum, 
of which the EU is a member, exchanges knowledge and seeks to improve development engagement in contexts 
of conflict and fragility. In addition, it monitors the implementation 
of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (IDPS 2011), an 
agreement signed by more than 40 countries and organisations in 
Busan (Korea) in 2011, which consists of guidelines for develop-
ment engagement in fragile countries. Some of the principles 
enshrined in this ‘New Deal’ have been crucial in shaping and in-
spiring the EU’s integrated approach to conflict and crisis. 
The analysis in this chapter reveals a gradual conceptual conver-
gence of headquarters-level approaches to dealing with conflicts 
and crises. In their constituent charters and relevant policy docu-
ments, the UN, NATO, the OSCE and the OECD-DAC spell out in 
more or less explicit detail four key virtues in the implementation of their comprehensive/integrated approach to 
conflicts and crises: being conflict-sensitive; pursuing effective multilateral coordination (within the organisation and 
with international actors); upholding the organisation’s values; and ensuring local ownership.  
Divergences between the organisations’ approaches arise from variances in their mandates to deal with conflicts 
and crises ‘in area’ (UN, OSCE, NATO) and/or ‘out of area’ (NATO, EU) by employing predominantly civilian 
(OSCE) or military (NATO) means or a combination thereof (UN, EU). Differences in the autonomy of the organi-
sations’ bodies to prepare for and decide on action determine the speed, scope and duration of implementation.
In their constituent charters and rele-
vant policy documents, the UN, NATO, 
the OSCE and the OECD-DAC spell 
out in more or less explicit detail four 
key virtues in the implementation of 
their comprehensive/integrated ap-
proach to conflicts and crises: being 
conflict-sensitive; pursuing effective 
multilateral coordination (within the 
organisation and with international ac-
tors); upholding the organisation’s 
values; and ensuring local ownership.  
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3 Institutional actors 
Implementing Europe’s ambitious integrated approach (IA) to conflicts and crises poses institutional challenges that 
are, to a certain extent, somewhat similar to the challenges that other multinational actors face. The EU’s challenges 
include securing sufficient buy-in from all EU actors and the problem of competition among institutions and man-
dates (Tardy 2017). Moreover, in contrast to the CA, which was about horizontal coordination and cooperation, a 
proper IA requires truly breaking the silos (Faleg 2018: 4).  
In order to achieve this, in addition to a need for a wholehearted adoption of the concept by various EEAS entities, 
the Commission and member states, there is also a need to effect genuine change in the EU’s organisational 
culture with regard to decision-making structures, the allocation of resources, transaction costs and incentives to 
sustain an integrated bureaucratic machine. This chapter investigates the key actors that drive the IA concept and 
assesses the ways in which intra- and inter-service as well as international coordination have been institutionalised. 
 
3.1 Implementing the IA at an intra-service EU level 
There is one key body that coordinates the EU’s integrated approach within the EEAS: the Directorate Integrated 
Approach for Security and Peace (Dir. ISP). Established in March 2019, this new directorate has become the main 
coordination hub for EU conflict-cycle responses (Debuysere and Blockmans 2019). Nestled under the Managing 
Directorate for CSDP and Crisis Response, Dir. ISP encompasses the old unit for Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of 
Law/SSR, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation (PRISM), which was regrouped with other CSDP parts 
of the house. Thus, the new directorate is responsible for, inter alia, concepts, knowledge management and training; 
conflict prevention and mediation; and international strategic planning for CSDP and stabilisation.  
3.1.1 A new setup within the EEAS 
A wave of institutional reform that started on 1 March 2019 has significantly altered the organisation chart of the 
EEAS. The reforms were partly driven by the recent increase in human resources devoted to defence policies and 
instruments (in particular, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO), which created a need to revise and 
extend the existing Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). As part of the EEAS, the CMPD func-
tioned as a single hub for civilian-military strategic planning for EU peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. 
Other motivations underpinning the reform process have been to better embed the EU’s integrated approach in the 
institutional structure of the EEAS as well as to facilitate and improve the EU’s ability to address global instability 
and fragility in an integrated way by deploying all its relevant policies, players and tools in a holistic and well-
coordinated manner. 
It is not the first time, however, that institutional change has sought to smooth the way for the implementation of an 
IA. Already in January 2017, the EEAS’s Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Mediation unit was upgraded to 
the status of a division directly reporting to the deputy secretary-general (DSG) for the CSDP and crisis response. 
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This division, called PRISM, became the focal point for EU responses to the conflict cycle, including prevention and 
resolution. Among other things, PRISM coordinated a working group of like-minded souls within the EEAS and the 
Commission – the so-called ‘guardians of the integrated approach’ – whose ultimate aim was to enhance opera-
tional capacity by adopting an IA to external conflicts and crises. 
 
Figure 1: PRISM comes into being in January 2017 (Source: EEAS 2019) 
 
However, due to its slightly odd position in the EEAS organisational chart (Figure 1), the need was felt to place 
PRISM in a full-blown directorate with its own managing and deputy managing directors. The result was the Direc-
torate Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (Dir. ISP). 
Itself a pillar responsible for crisis response and planning, Dir. ISP simultaneously operates with a ‘policy pillar’ and 
a ‘conduct pillar’ (Figure 2). While the policy pillar (Security and Defence Policy, or SECDEFPOL) brings together 
all policies relating to security and defence (e.g. PESCO, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), and 
cybersecurity), the conduct pillar combines the operational headquarters of both civilian (Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability, or CPCC) and military (Military Planning and Conduct Capability, or MPCC) CSDP missions. 
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Figure 2: Directorate ISP replaces PRISM in March 2019 (Source: EEAS 2019) 
 
 
3.1.2 Improved managerial strength and operational implementation 
Thanks to this improved in-house logic and regrouping of staff capacity (90-odd members), Dir. ISP hopes to forge 
a better division of labour among its four branches.  
While the Concepts, Knowledge Management and Training unit (ISP.1) seeks to revive and operationalise im-
portant concepts (e.g. disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security-sector reform (SSR), and 
human security) and boost a process of lessons learned, the Conflict Prevention and Mediation unit (ISP.2) princi-
pally institutionalises the former tasks of the ‘guardians of the integrated approach’ thanks to its three teams, which 
respectively work on conflict prevention, early warning and mediation. The Integrated Strategic Planning unit (ISP.3) 
brings in some of the later phases of the conflict cycle (e.g. CSDP and stabilisation). Lastly, a Consular Affairs unit 
(ISP.4) has been added to the directorate to facilitate the protection of and support for EU citizens and staff in case 
of natural or man-made disasters abroad. 
Incorporating a revamped PRISM unit into a full-fledged directorate should clarify and strengthen the chain of com-
mand in implementing the EU’s IA. In principle, its director and managing director will now be in a position to engage 
directly with counterparts at their respective levels in the hierarchy. Indeed, the introduction of the new post of 
managing director, who presides over both the policy (SECDEFPOL) and planning (ISP) branches, means that it 
will no longer be necessary to turn to an over-solicited DSG to engage in intra-service deconfliction. For example, 
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Dir. ISP hosts crisis meetings that bring together all relevant EEAS divisions and Commission DGs (ECHO, 
DEVCO, NEAR) involved in crisis management. More than before, the geographical desks play a prominent role in 
these meetings, which are chaired by the DSG for CSDP or his (or her) representative. 
In addition to improving its managerial strength, formalising and upgrading the former PRISM division will also 
foster better integration and coordination within the EEAS. By absorbing the former Crisis Management and Plan-
ning Directorate (CMPD), which is tasked with the political-strategic planning of CSDP missions, Dir. ISP now looks 
at the crisis cycle in its entirety. In principle, merging PRISM with CSDP planning into a single directorate should 
facilitate the operational implementation of an integrated approach. 
3.1.3 No silver bullet for integration without political buy-in 
However, the fact that the directorate has been called ‘Integrated Approach for Security and Peace’ – with ‘security’ 
preceding ‘peace’ rather than the other way around, as is common in the international context – raises questions 
about where the unit’s focus lies. The staff balance also tilts towards ISP.3, with over a third of all the directorate’s 
personnel operating in strategic planning for CSDP and stabilisation. While, on paper, the (staff) capacity for pre-
vention and mediation has improved compared to PRISM, it is clear that political will on the part of the member 
states will be needed to prioritise this aspect of the EU’s crisis response. 
However, this is exactly where the shoe pinches for Dir. ISP. Rather than merging the operational level with the 
political level, the new directorate only merges the operational side. The reforms did not further integrate the work 
of the geographical divisions and of the EEAS’ DSG for political affairs. While Dir. ISP may trigger integrated action 
at the bureaucratic level, it will not necessarily do so at the political level. For a service that was expected to be the 
embodiment of inter-institutional cooperation, it is paradoxical to have developed thick bureaucratic walls within its 
own organisation.  
Moreover, the member states are largely absent from the new directorate’s activities even though the Political and 
Security Committee is permanently chaired by someone in-house and despite the efforts of Dir. ISP to convene 
meetings of an informal network of corresponding structures, which exist in some ministries of foreign affairs.  
To be truly effective from an IA perspective, the latest wave of institutional reforms should have been more informed 
by, and geared towards, the DSG for political affairs. In this regard, lessons can be learned from the recent UN 
reforms, which tried to do just that: The former Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, now the Depart-
ment for Peace Operations, or DPO) was integrated with the former Department of Political Affairs (DPA, now the 
Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, or DPPA). This was done at both the assistant-DSG and geo-
graphical levels in headquarters and in-country through newly empowered resident coordinators (see Chapter 2.2). 
By failing to realise the integration of the new structures for CSDP and crisis response into the geographical man-
aging directorates of the EEAS, mainly due to limitations posed by the Treaties, Dir. ISP cannot be seen as a silver 
bullet for a ‘whole-of-Europe’ approach to external conflicts and crises. That said, the new directorate is an important 
step in efforts to improve the EU’s bureaucratic capacity to coordinate its IA.  
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3.2 Implementing the IA at an intra-service EU level 
There are some formal bodies that facilitate coordination among the various EU institutions – principally among the 
European Commission, the Council and the EEAS – in tackling external conflict and crisis. 
3.2.1 Between EEAS and Commission: Crisis meetings and CGEA 
Previously organised by PRISM, ISP.1 of the new Dir. ISP convenes crisis meetings on a ‘need to act’ basis (inter-
view EEAS, May 2019). The goal of these meetings is to bring together all relevant EEAS and Commission services 
and actors – including EEAS crisis response/management structures, geographical divisions, the EU Military Com-
mittee and relevant European Commission DGs (ECHO, DEVCO, NEAR) – to ensure an adequate and timely crisis 
response. 
The crisis meetings are intended to establish a clear division of labour among the different services and to provide 
political and/or strategic guidance in the management of a given crisis (interview EEAS, May 2019). Outside of 
emergency situations, there are reportedly also more regular country-team meetings at the EEAS, to which all 
relevant members of the Commission are invited for policy coordination (interview policy coordination unit EEAS, 
April 2019; interview EEAS, May 2019). 
Two related shortcomings can be detected in the organisation of crisis meetings. First, they do not serve as plat-
forms to incorporate the views of the member states (interview UNLOPS, May 2019), which naturally limits their 
potential. This points to a broader shortcoming of the EEAS, namely, its apparent inability to reflect the views of 
capitals and merge them into a synthesis by which member states feel represented (and bound). A second short-
coming is that the crisis meetings are only established on an ad hoc basis and therefore do not regularly provide 
more systematic platforms for integrated policy coordination and engagement of, say, mediation, prevention and 
SSR tools in situations of protracted crisis or conflict (Blockmans 2012: 29–31). Sometimes, however, this is rem-
edied by the fact that crisis meetings develop into longer-lasting task forces that meet on a more structural basis to 
follow up on and monitor a certain conflict (interview EEAS, April 2019). On policy issues other than crisis theatres, 
the strategic planning division of the EEAS has established a parallel practice of organising so-called ‘policy plat-
forms’ for coordination with, inter alia, Commission services.  
The Commissioner’s Group on External Action (CGEA) was reactivated by then-President Jean-Claude Juncker 
and represents one of the most important institutional initiatives in EU foreign policymaking since the merger of the 
position of the high representative for CFSP with that of vice-president of the Commission (to form the HRVP) and 
the creation of the EEAS (Blockmans and Russack 2015). The CGEA, chaired by the HRVP, brings together the 
commissioners for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, International Cooperation and 
Development, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, and Trade. Commissioners who do not belong to this pre-
defined cluster of four, but who nevertheless have an interest in the items on the CGEA’s agenda, are also invited.  
Rather than being authorised to adopt official decisions, the CGEA buttresses the standard procedure of decision-
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making within the Commission, i.e. inter-service consultation (ibid.). This administrative procedure, launched on 
the initiative of a commissioner, is intended to include and inform all services that have a legitimate interest in the 
proposal. The outcome of this process is reflected in joint communications, proposals, reports, consultative papers 
and decisions, which are issued by the Commission in cooperation with the HRVP.  
One goal of the CGEA is to align the positions of the HRVP and the various commissioners on responses to crises. 
While the CGEA aims to harmonise diverging interests of Commission DGs in certain conflict zones, the HRVP 
acts as a coordinator to mobilise instruments, funding and expertise managed by the Commission and to capitalise 
on a political consensus reached in the Council. A concrete example concerns the Commission’s adoption of a 
legislative proposal offering additional temporary access for Tunisian olive oil to the EU market to help support 
Tunisia’s recovery in the wake of the terrorist attack of 26 June 2015 in Sousse, which had prompted a reaction 
from the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) on 20 July 2015 on the need to further assist Tunisia in its political and 
economic transition in a concrete and targeted manner.  
In presenting her “geopolitical” Commission, President-elect Ursula von der Leyen has emphasised the need for 
the College of Commissioners to discuss a weekly fixed agenda point 
covering external relations, including crisis prevention and manage-
ment, to ensure maximum participation by all DGs concerned. This 
would not only strengthen coherence within the Commission, but 
could also help the HRVP to whip up political will among member 
states by showing that the tools managed by the Commission can be 
put at the Union’s disposal to boost effective foreign policy. A good 
example of intra-Commission deconfliction and Council-backed crisis 
response is the case of Myanmar, for which the CGEA successfully 
sought to balance its humanitarian aid, sanctions, trade preferences 
and development responses in response to the military’s genocidal 
actions in Rakhine State (interview Commission, April 2019).  
 
 
3.2.2 Between Council, EEAS and Commission  
Depending on the topic on the agenda, the FAC convenes member states’ ministers of foreign affairs, defence, 
development or trade. The FAC is chaired by the HRVP and also attended by responsible members of the Com-
mission (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 66).  
However, rather than by the FAC, most decisions are taken by the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER II) or the Political and Security Council (PSC). While the former deals with EU external action (e.g. 
development cooperation and trade policy) and internal policies with an external dimension, the latter deals with 
CFSP/CSDP policies. The PSC, which is composed of one ambassador per member state as well as a representa-
tive of the Commission, of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and of the Committee for Civilian Aspects for Crisis 
Management (CIVCOM), is in fact the logical counterpart in the Council of the CGEA. As the central body for 
preparatory work for the FAC, it convenes at least once a week in addition to exercising the political control and 
strategic direction of civilian and military CSDP operations (ibid.: 69–70).  
In presenting her “geopolitical” 
Commission, President-elect Ursula 
von der Leyen has emphasised the 
need for the College of Commission-
ers to discuss a weekly fixed agenda 
point covering external relations, in-
cluding crisis prevention and 
management, to ensure maximum 
participation by all DGs concerned. 
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Below the level of the PSC and COREPER, there is a large network of working groups that shape EU external 
action. These working groups consist of experts from the member states (either from the permanent representations 
in Brussels or from the ministries back home), from the EEAS and/or from the Commission, and they are chaired 
by the EEAS, which also gets to set the agenda.8 While most of them are geography-based, some are theme-
based. 
Both in the Commission (SG Inter-institutional and external relations) and the EEAS (SG AFFGEN Inter-institutional 
relations, policy coordination and public diplomacy), there are also specific units that facilitate intra- and inter-ser-
vice coordination. These units also facilitate an IA by setting up platforms and guidelines to cooperate (interview 
EEAS policy coordination unit, April 2019). In times of crisis, the heads of division operate in a rather informal but 
swift manner, including via a pre-established WhatsApp group (interview EEAS, April 2019).  
Yet, while coordination and cooperation take place among the different DGs and EEAS, the policy coordination unit 
within the Secretariat General of the Commission has in the past not always been involved in coordinated policy 
discussions (interview EC SecGen, May 2019). This raises questions about the added value of the above-men-
tioned units in fostering inter-institutional coordination. Their inclusion should not depend on personalities.
3.2.3 Between Parliament, Commission and EEAS: Mediation and Dialogue Unit 
The role of the European Parliament (EP) in EU foreign policy in general and crisis response in particular is quite 
limited. In the CFSP/CSDP framework, the EP has only a consultative role, and the Treaty on the European Union 
(Art. 36) says that the HRVP “shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic 
choices” of the CFSP and CSDP, and that the EP “may address questions or make recommendations to the Council 
or the High Representative.” Twice a year, the EP also holds a debate on progress in the implementation of the 
CFSP and CSDP. In practice, the EP has managed to obtain regular formal and informal dialogue with the HRVP, 
the EEAS and the Commission. The basis of this dialogue is spelled out in an inter-institutional agreement from 
late 2013 that set out the following (EP, Council of the EU, and EC 2013: 5): 
Each year, the High Representative shall consult the European Parliament on a forward-looking document, 
which shall be transmitted by June 15 of the year in question, setting out the main aspects and basic choices 
of the CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the Union, an evaluation of the 
measures launched in the year n-1 and an assessment of the coordination and complementarity of CFSP 
with the Union’s other external financial instruments. Furthermore, the High Representative shall keep the 
European Parliament regularly informed by holding joint consultation meetings at least five times a year, in 
the framework of the regular political dialogue on the CFSP, to be agreed at the latest in the Conciliation 
Committee. Participation in those meetings shall be determined by the European Parliament and the Council 
                                                     
8 The Committee on Development Cooperation (CODEV) is chaired by the country holding the rotating presidency of the 
Council. 
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respectively, bearing in mind the objective, and the nature of the information exchanged in those meetings.  
The Commission shall be invited to participate in those meetings. 
If the Council adopts a decision in the field of the CFSP entailing expenditure, the High Representative shall 
immediately, and in any event no later than five working days thereafter, send the European Parliament an 
estimate of the costs envisaged (a ‘financial statement’), in particular those costs regarding time-frame, staff 
employed, use of premises and other infrastructure, transport facilities, training requirements and security 
arrangements. 
Once a quarter, the Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council about the implemen-
tation of CFSP actions and the financial forecasts for the remainder of the financial year. 
When it comes to EU external action (outside CFSP/CSDP) and internal policies with an external dimension, the 
EP has two major instruments to influence EU foreign policy (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). On the one hand, 
there is the consent procedure, which gives the EP a veto power over the ratification of international agreements. 
On the other hand, the EP has important budgetary powers, which it can indirectly use as leverage over EU foreign 
policy.9  
One ‘crisis response’ area in which the EP does play a role is mediation activities. What originally started as an 
informal consultation by Commissioner Johannes Hahn with certain MEPs in North Macedonia (or the FYROM, as 
it was then called) has gradually developed into a Mediation and Dialogue Unit (one pillar within the Directorate for 
Democracy Support at DG EXPO) in the European Parliament. In terms of conflict prevention and mediation, this 
unit regularly cooperates with DG NEAR, DG DEVCO, the EEAS and the EU delegation on the ground.  
The EP’s Mediation and Dialogue Unit coordinates political mediation activities with third-country parliaments (in-
terview EP, April 2019). One key instrument developed by this unit as a soft-power tool in the area of parliamentary 
mediation and dialogue is the Jean Monnet Dialogue for Peace and Democracy. This mediation and dialogue 
working method, inspired by French political economist and diplomat Jean Monnet (d. 1979), encourages pragmatic 
dialogue to achieve concrete, consensual results and has been applied in Ukraine and Macedonia. The Jean Mon-
net Dialogues of the EP have an inter-institutional character, as delegation members and actors from the EEAS 
and Commission assist in organising it (European Parliament 2019a).  
Nonetheless, inter-institutional coordination in the realm of mediation is not well institutionalised (interview EP, May 
2019).10 While Dir. ISP deals with the more technical level of mediation (early warning, expert support,11 conflict 
analysis), the Mediation and Dialogue Unit at the EP is much more hands-on and political. Operating in parallel, 
parliamentary diplomacy can have a significant added value. In this respect, one could even argue that the EP 
                                                     
9 However, on particular issues – such as the CFSP budget managed by the FPI service of the Commission (which deals with, 
e.g., EUSRs) – it is the PSC/COREPER rather than the Parliament that scrutises budgets.  
10 The EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) recently issued a report on ‘Building EU capacity on conflict prevention and 
mediation’ to push the next Commission to do more on conflict prevention via a roadmap (European Parliament 2019b). 
11 The fact that Dir. ISP has a small budget for more operational activities (€500,000) is a complete anomaly slipped into the 
budget of the EEAS. The FPI service has a much larger budget in support of third-party mediation efforts. 
page 28 | Europe´s Coherence Gap in External Crisis and Conflict Management 
 
actually has more say in and influence on EU foreign policy than national parliaments over the foreign policy of 
their respective member states. 
 
3.3 Coordination at the international level 
3.3.1 United Nations 
UN-EU cooperation has seen worse days,12 as both multilateral actors aim to preserve the importance of multilat-
eralism in today’s multipolar world (interview UNLOPS, May 2019). While the EU’s CSDP missions and the UN’s 
peacekeeping operations were somehow in competition a decade ago, the urgency of the threat posed to a multi-
lateral, rules-based order – in combination with the important steering role played by HRVP Federica Mogherini 
and the UN Liaison Office representing DPA-DPKO in Brussels – has greatly fostered EU-UN cooperation and 
coordination in the past five years.  
There is a EU-UN steering committee that convenes every six months in either Brussels or New York, and that 
comes up with a list of shared action points for conflict response. The EU and UN also engage in a Conflict Pre-
vention Dialogue and in continuous working-level interactions, both between the two headquarters and among 
missions and operations. Special representatives of the UN secretary-general (UNSG) are regularly invited to brief 
the FAC or the PSC (UNLOPS 2019) and, when they make their annual trips to New York, PSC ambassadors have 
informal meetings with UNSG representatives. This helps to coordinate EU foreign policy with decision-making in 
the UN Security Council. Following the 2015–2018 priorities, both actors have recently adopted a new set of prior-
ities for the 2019–2021 period (Council of the European Union 2018b) to reinforce the EU-UN Strategic Partnership 
on Peace Operations and Crisis Management. In a related press statement, the UN (UN 2018) described the eight 
priorities (in the first person) for cooperation as follows:  
1) Establish a UN-EU collaborative platform on ‘women, peace and security’ to enhance coherence and inte-
gration of gender perspectives throughout our cooperation. 
2) Strengthen cooperation between missions and operations in the field with a view to ensuring increased rec-
iprocity in assets-sharing, coherence and continuity. 
3) Assess how best to act in complementarity during the planning and execution of transitions of missions and 
operations, considering the development of common guidelines. 
4) Further facilitate EU member states’ contributions and support to UN peace operations and the UN secretary-
general’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative. 
5) In support of conflict prevention and political processes and solutions, identify, mobilise and use tools – 
mediation, early warning and security-sector reform (SSR) – and coordinate political messages and strategic 
communication in response to early signs of conflict, as relevant. 
6)  Intensify cooperation on policing, the rule of law and SSR to include also the justice and penitentiary struc-
tures; and assess possibilities for cooperation on civilian rapid response. 
                                                     
12 For a critical analysis, see Medinilla, Veron and Mazzara 2019. 
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7)  To enhance cooperation with and support to African-led peace operations, explore (together with the African 
Union (AU)) possible initiatives to deepen trilateral cooperation (UN-EU-AU) on peace operations, conflict 
prevention and crisis management, as well as on regional strategies. 
8)  Efforts to enhance performance of peace operations on the ground will be taken forward through strength-
ened cooperation on training and capacity building, including exercises. Focusing our cooperation around 
these eight priority areas will allow us to continue reinforcing the UN-EU strategic partnership on peace 
operations and crisis management in response to increasingly complex causes of crisis, and interconnected 
peace and security challenges. 
The EU and UN also increasingly operate in a trilateral format with the African Union. One key example has been 
the AU-EU-UN Joint Taskforce to address the situation of migrants and refugees in Libya. While this trilateral co-
operation has achieved some of its objectives, it faces multiple political and practical challenges, including the need 
to improve coherence between European and African actions (Abderrahim 2018).  
3.3.2 NATO 
EU-NATO relations have traditionally been described in lethargic terms due to longstanding political blockages 
(Duke 2008; Smith 2011). Nevertheless, bound by a shared commitment to universal values of freedom, democracy 
and the rule of law, NATO and the EU share not only strategic goals, but also common global security challenges. 
The new security environment has driven the EU to assume a bigger role in security and defence, and has forced 
EU-NATO relations to evolve into a more practical strategic partnership. This has been prompted by the facts that 
their security is interconnected and that neither organisation has the full range of tools needed to address the new 
security challenges on its own.  
This new narrative was put forward on 10 July 2016 in the joint declaration of a NATO summit in Warsaw (NATO 
2016a). While the document confirms NATO as the primus inter pares regarding defence matters, it also notes 
that “EU efforts will also strengthen NATO, and thus will improve our common security.” The 2016 joint declara-
tion outlined seven concrete areas where the bilateral cooperation ought to be enhanced (NATO 2016b): 
countering hybrid threats; operational cooperation, including at sea and on migration; cyber security and de-
fence; defence capabilities; defence industry and research; exercises; and supporting the capacity-building 
efforts of partner nations to the east and south. Subsequently, the EU and NATO established a common set of 
42 actions to implement all seven areas of cooperation (Council of the European Union 2017b). The set also 
introduced a monitoring mechanism to review progress on a biannual basis.  
Obscured by US President Trump’s theatrics at the first summit held at NATO’s new headquarters in Brussels, 
a second joint declaration on NATO-EU cooperation was adopted on 10 July 2018 (NATO 2018). The joint 
declaration emphasised “coherent, complementary and interoperable” capability development and encouraged 
the fullest possible involvement of non-EU allies in the European Union’s new initiatives in the field of defence.  
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In terms of achievements, one cannot help but note that, to date, most of the low-hanging fruits have already 
been picked. A European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats has been set up in Helsinki, and 
frequent contacts at the working level and staff-to-staff communication have been achieved among the EU’s 
Hybrid Fusion Cell, NATO’s Hybrid Analysis Branch and the centre of excellence. But, so far, trilateral cooper-
ation has only been based on open-source material, and information- and intelligence-sharing between the two 
partner organisations still remains a great challenge. Cybersecurity and defence is one of the areas in which 
NATO and the EU are working together more closely than ever. Analysis of cyber threats and collaboration 
between incident-response teams is one area of further cooperation; another is the exchange of best practices 
concerning the cyber aspects and implications of crisis management (NATO 2017).  
In short, cooperation between the EU and NATO has been gradually improving beyond the largely defunct ‘Berlin 
Plus’ arrangements, whereby the EU could borrow intelligence, troops and equipment from NATO (only used once 
since 2003, i.e. in Bosnia-Herzegovina). It is obvious that, within the defined framework, there are many obstacles 
to be overcome before opportunities can be more fully exploited. Yet, the emergence of the EU as a stronger 
defence and security actor may spur further cooperation (Blockmans 2018) – not competing or duplicating, but 
complementing NATO efforts in an integrated approach between the two organisations (Stoltenberg 2018). 
3.3.3 OSCE 
Only limited progress has been made in developing synergies between the OSCE and the EU, which alone com-
prises already half of the membership of the OSCE (Jorgensen 2008). The contributions of the EU family make up 
over 70 percent of the OSCE’s budget, not to mention the extensive financial support the EU gives to specific 
operations, such as the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. Furthermore, there are many examples of cooper-
ation between the OSCE and the EU, such as in electoral observation missions or in addressing protracted conflicts, 
such as the Transdniestrian settlement process. 
At the same time, there are areas in which this cooperation could be improved. For instance, conflict mediation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere in the Balkan region would lend itself to more extensive EU-OSCE cooperation 
and a pooling of expertise. While preparing its annual progress reports on the EU enlargement process, the Euro-
pean Commission organises regular consultations with the OSCE and the Council of Europe to review and compare 
the organisations’ respective assessments in their areas of expertise. With regard to the OSCE, given its autono-
mous institutions and its extensive expertise in the areas mentioned above, its assessments and views could be 
more systematically reflected in the European Commission’s assessment (Fouéré 2015).  
Indeed, considerable gains could still be achieved in policy areas where the OSCE has developed extensive ex-
pertise and the EU has few competences (e.g. media freedom, the rights of national minorities, and education) as 
well as in domains where the EU is in the process of building up its respective capacities (e.g. in mediation and 
conflict prevention). Sharing analytical research and organising joint training exercises for people working in the 
field would be of mutual benefit in dealing with conflict situations in the OSCE region as well as in enhancing the 
much-needed early-warning mechanisms throughout the region. The OSCE’s comparative advantage is reflected 
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in its flexible structure and autonomous institutions, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Representative for the Freedom of the Media. 
3.3.4 OECD-DAC and other actors 
The EU regularly cooperates with the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), a subsidiary body of 
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which brings together DAC members and key multilateral 
agencies working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (interview DG DEVCO, April 2019; see Chapter 2.2). 
Among the other international organisations with which the EU cooperates closely is the Council of Europe, whose 
Venice Commission plays a very valuable (and, in many respects, unique) role in buttressing the rule of law in 
Europe’s wider neighbourhood.13 
While civil society organisations play an important role in conflict theatres, their role at the headquarters level is 
generally limited to providing inputs in consultations for the development and review of policies. However, this is 
not to say that civil society has not had an impact on the EU institutional structure. There was, for instance, heavy 
lobbying by civil society (as well as by the European Parliament and a few member states) to create a Division for 
Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation when the EEAS was set up. In fact, over almost two decades, it 
was specialist civil society (e.g. EPLO, International Alert and Saferworld) that kept the pressure on the EU to adopt 
and use conflict analysis as well as to adapt its institutional structures to function in a more integrated fashion. The 
Commission, followed by the EEAS, have established various structures to more efficiently engage and use the 
expertise of civil society through semi-formal structures.14
                                                     
13 For further references, see Wessel and Odermatt (2019). 
14 See, e.g., EPLO (2019). 
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4 Degree of interaction and instruments used  
4.1 Finances 
The current external financing instruments of the EU, as established under the 2014–2020 multiannual financial 
framework (MFF), have struggled to provide enough coherence and flexibility in responding to today’s quickly shift-
ing contexts. In the face of mounting instability in the neighbourhood (and beyond) and a sharp increase in refugee 
flows and migration, the key finding of a mid-term self-assessment by the Commission was the need for “more 
strategic and overarching programming” and “coherent interactions at operational level in the renewed international 
context” (EC 2017c: 2). The need for flexibility and the problem of silo approaches similarly figure in a ‘Coherence 
Report’ from external evaluators (EC 2017a) and the European Parliament’s implementation assessment (EPRS 
2018). 
In an effort to address these recommendations, the Commission has come up with a new and bold proposal for 
future spending on issues relating to the neighbourhood, development and international cooperation (EC 2018a). 
By merging the 11 existing instruments outlined below (Table 
2) into one financial instrument, the so-called Neighbourhood, 
Development and International Cooperation Instrument 
(NDICI) put forward in the Commission’s proposal seeks to 
increase simplification, coherence, responsiveness and stra-
tegic direction in EU external action. 
While commendable from a coherence-seeking perspective, 
the desire to simplify the EU’s financial toolbox and to in-
crease the Commission’s flexibility in spending has raised 
concerns among various parts of the EU’s apparatus and member states alike. How will a unified instrument reflect 
the privileged relationship of the neighbourhood with the EU (EaP CSF 2018)? What will the governance structure 
and operationalisation of the instrument look like (Jones, De Groof and Kahiluoto 2018)? How likely is it that the 
NDICI will survive broader MFF negotiations in the Council (Castillejo et al. 2018)? These are some key questions 
that observers have addressed in various analyses of the proposed jumbo instrument.  
 
By merging the 11 existing instruments 
outlined below into one financial instru-
ment, the so-called Neighbourhood, 
Development and International Coopera-
tion Instrument (NDICI) put forward in the 
Commission’s proposal seeks to in-
crease simplification, coherence, 
responsiveness and strategic direction 
in EU external action. 
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Table 2: Comparison between current programmes and the NDICI proposal, taking into account Brexit (EU27) 
and the budgeting of the European Development Fund. 
MFF 2014–2020  
€70.1 billion + 6.9 billion15 
MFF 2021–2027  
€89.2 billion  
11 instruments 
= European Neighbourhood Instrument, European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights, Instrument Contributing to 
Stability and Peace, Development Cooperation Instrument, 
Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with Third Countries, 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, Macro-Financial 
Assistance, External Lending Mandate, Guarantee Fund for 
External Action, European Fund for Sustainable Development 
and European Development Fund (excluding African Peace 
Facility). 
1 instrument, 4 components  
= Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation 
(NDICI) 
Geographic Programmes €57,568 million 
(74.8%) 
Geographic Programmes €68,000 million 
(76%) 
Neighbourhood €17,693 million  
(30.7%) 
Neighbourhood €22,000 million  
(32%) 
- Sub-Saharan Africa  €26,097 million  
(45.3%) 
- Sub-Saharan Africa  €32,000 million  
(47%) 
- Asia and the Pacific €9,819 million  
(17.1%) 
- Asia and the Pacific €10,000 million  
(15%) 
- The Americas and  
- Caribbean 
€3,959 million  
(6.9%) 
- The Americas and Carib-
bean 
€4,000 million  
(6%) 
Thematic Programmes €9,139 million  
(11.9%) 
Thematic Programmes €7,000 million  
(8%) 
- Human Rights and  
- Democracy  
€1,302 million 
(14.24%) 
- Human Rights and Democ-
racy  
€1,500 million  
(22%) 
- Civil Society Organisations  €1,414 million  
(15.5%) 
- Civil Society Organisations  €1,500 million  
(21%) 
                                                     
15 The €70.1 billion budget for 2014–2020, as estimated for the EU27, does not include the budget for emerging challenges and 
priorities, as the latter is not necessarily funded under the MFF.  
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MFF 2014–2020  
€70.1 billion + 6.9 billion15 
MFF 2021–2027  
€89.2 billion  
11 instruments 
= European Neighbourhood Instrument, European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights, Instrument Contributing to 
Stability and Peace, Development Cooperation Instrument, 
Partnership Instrument for Cooperation with Third Countries, 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, Macro-Financial 
Assistance, External Lending Mandate, Guarantee Fund for 
External Action, European Fund for Sustainable Development 
and European Development Fund (excluding African Peace 
Facility). 
1 instrument, 4 components  
= Neighbourhood, Development, International Cooperation 
(NDICI) 
- Stability and Peace  €706 million 
(7.7%) 
- Stability and Peace  €1,000 million 
(14%) 
Global Challenges €5,716 million 
(62.5%) 
Global Challenges €3,000 million 
(43%) 
Rapid Response Pillar €3,407 million 
(4.4%) 
Rapid Response Pillar €4,000 million 
(5%) 
Emerging Challenges and 
Priorities Cushion  
€6,869 million 
(8.9%) 
Emerging Challenges and 
Priorities Cushion 
€10,200 million 
(11%) 
Source: Adapted from data from the Secretariat of the Committee on Budgets, as included in a December 2018 
European Parliament briefing (Immenkamp 2019). 
An underexposed angle in the existing body of commentary is how the NDICI relates to the EU’s commitment to 
an “integrated approach to conflict and crisis” (EEAS 2016: 9). Pooled funding and joint financial instruments can 
be seen as a way to facilitate the implementation of this kind of integrated approach.  
While the preamble of  the Commission proposal (EC 2018a) outlines a commitment to the five priorities enshrined 
in the Global Strategy, the proposal does not mention the integrated approach explicitly. References are made, 
however, to “a more geographically and thematically comprehensive approach” by tackling policies in a “trans-
regional, multi-sectoral and global way” with a goal of breaking down silos (ibid.: 9–10). But in what ways does the 
NDICI regulation actually live up to facilitating a multi-dimensional, -level, -lateral and -phased approach to conflict 
and crisis? 
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4.1.1 Multi-dimensional 
According to the Global Strategy, the integrated approach is multi-dimensional in that it draws on “all available 
policies and instruments aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution” (ibid.: 28), and that it brings 
together diplomatic engagement, CSDP missions and operations, development cooperation and humanitarian as-
sistance. 
Merging financial assistance for neighbourhood, development and international cooperation agendas under the 
NDICI should facilitate the financial implementation of a multi-dimensional approach to crises. However, one won-
ders how ‘integrated’ the NDICI actually is given that the budgets for, say, the Neighbourhood (under its geographic 
pillar) or Stability and Peace (under its thematic pillar) remain ring-fenced (Table 2).  
Moreover, the NDICI proposal does not cover all dimensions of EU external action spending. For one, CSDP op-
erations and military capacity-building for CFSP objectives cannot be included under the EU budget (and, hence, 
under the NDICI) due to limitations enshrined in the EU Treaty.16 Similarly, humanitarian aid resides outside the 
NDICI’s scope in compliance with the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence.17 Suffi-
cient coordination among the NDICI, the ECHO budget (including the EU’s Emergency Aid Reserve), and different 
types of security funding will therefore be key.  
In fact, four different security-related instruments and funds are currently on the table for the 2021–2027 period: 
the NDICI, the CFSP budget, the European Peace Facility and the European Defence Fund (Table 3). While the 
NDICI and the CFSP budget mainly seek to finance soft security needs, the proposed European Peace Facility 
(HRVP 2018) caters to CSDP operations with military and defence objectives and the European Defence Fund (EC 
2018b) aims to encourage the development and operationalisation of joint defence capabilities among member 
states (Blockmans 2018). The envisaged split between the NDICI and other funds will continue to hamper the type 
of ‘civ-mil’ coordination that a truly integrated, nimble and effective approach to external conflict and crisis requires. 
                                                     
16 The EU Treaty (TEU Article 41.2) does not allow the Union’s budget to be used for military or defence purposes. 
17 As outlined in Section 2.1 of the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.  
page 36 | Europe´s Coherence Gap in External Crisis and Conflict Management 
 
Table 3: List of security, defence and military instruments and funds 
EU financial instruments and funds relating to security and defence 
2014–2020 2021–2027 proposals 
No. Financial 
instrument 
Funding 
Source 
Scope Financial  
instrument 
Funding 
Source 
Scope 
1. Instrument 
contributing 
to Stability 
and Peace 
(IcSP) 
 
 
EU budget  
€2,339 million 
under current 
MFF 
 
 
Supporting 
of security 
initiatives 
and peace-
building  
activities in 
partner 
countries, 
with no  
military or 
defence  
purposes. 
Includes  
‘capacity-
building in 
support of 
security and 
develop-
ment’ 
(CBSD), 
with objec-
tives in the 
field of de-
velopment 
and human 
security. 
Included in the 
Neighbourhood, 
Development 
and Interna-
tional 
Cooperation In-
strument 
(NDICI) 
 
 
 
 
EU budget  
€1,000  
million is 
specifically 
allocated un-
der the next 
MFF for 
peace and 
stability (as 
part of the 
thematic pil-
lar), but the 
NDICI also 
includes un-
allocated and 
more flexible 
spending in 
this realm 
(cf. Table 4). 
Includes conflict, 
peace and stabil-
ity actions in 
geographic and 
thematic pro-
grammes, on the 
one hand, and in 
rapid response 
and emergency, 
on the other (cf. 
Table 4).  
Does include 
CBSD, with ob-
jectives in the 
field of develop-
ment and human 
security.18  
2. CFSP 
budget pro-
visions 
within EU 
budget 
EU budget  
€2,338 million 
under the cur-
rent MFF. 
Financing of 
administra-
tive costs of 
all CSDP 
missions 
and the  
operational 
costs of civil-
ian CSDP.19 
CFSP budget 
provisions 
within EU 
budget 
 
EU budget 
€3,000 mil-
lion under 
the next 
MFF, outside 
the NDICI. 
Financing of ad-
ministrative costs 
of all CSDP mis-
sions and the 
operational costs 
of civilian CSDP. 
3. Athena 
Mechanism 
Off budget  
Annual share 
by MS, ex-
cluding 
Denmark. 
Financing of 
common op-
erational 
costs of  
military op-
erations 
European 
Peace Facility 
 
Off budget 
€10,500 mil-
lion, to be 
financed by 
Enables the  
financing of oper-
ational actions 
(e.g. EU or part-
ners’ military 
operations) under 
                                                     
18 The proposal of the European Peace Facility (HRVP 2018: 2) outlines: “Current provisions on Capacity Building of military 
actors in support of Development and Security for Development (CBSD) as set out in the Instrument contributing to Stability and 
Peace, provide for actions which mainly pursue objectives in the field of development. The Facility will be able to finance 
capacity building activities in support of third countries’ armed forces in pursuit of CFSP objectives” (bolding added). However, 
discussions regarding how CBSD will exactly take shape under both the NDICI and the European Peace Facility are still ongoing. 
19 Ibid. 
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EU financial instruments and funds relating to security and defence 
2014–2020 2021–2027 proposals 
Limited 
budget.20 
under 
CSDP. 
MS, exclud-
ing Denmark. 
 
 
CFSP that have 
military or de-
fence implications 
(cf. TUE Art. 
41.2).  
Is not restricted to 
Africa. 
Brings together 
former Athena 
Mechanism and 
African Peace  
Facility. Also in-
cludes CBSD, 
with objectives in 
the field of CFSP 
(in support of 
countries’ armed 
forces).21  
African 
Peace Fa-
cility 
Off budget 
€1,662.5  
million for the 
2014-2018 
period,22 
funded by MS 
(excluding 
Denmark) as 
part of 11th 
European De-
velopment 
Fund. 
Supports the 
African Un-
ion’s and 
African Re-
gional 
Economic 
Communi-
ties’ efforts 
in the area 
of peace 
and security. 
Includes ca-
pacity-
building, 
early re-
sponse 
mechanisms 
and support 
to Peace 
Support Op-
erations in 
Africa. 
4.    European  
Defence Fund 
 
Partly funded 
by EU 
budget  
€13 billion 
under the 
next MFF 
and partly 
funded by 
MS contribu-
tions. 
 
 
Looks to increase 
coordination of in-
vestment among 
MS throughout 
the industrial  
cycle (from re-
search to 
development of 
prototypes to ac-
quisition of 
defence  
capabilities). 
Includes financ-
ing of priority 
projects agreed 
by MS within the 
framework of 
CSDP and 
NATO. 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
                                                     
20 In 2014, for five military operations, the Athena budget was estimated at around €78 million (EPRS 2016). 
21 Ibid. 
22 This is the sum of the €1,030.5 million committed under the 2014-2016 Action Programme (EC 2018c) and the €592 million 
committed under the 2017–2018 Action Programme (Council of the European Union 2017a). At the time of writing (October 
2019), the APF budget for 2019–2020 was not yet available. 
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4.1.2 Multi-level 
According to the Global Strategy, the integrated approach is multi-level in that it acts to address the complexity of 
conflicts “at the local, national, regional and global levels” (EEAS 2016: 29). 
The NDICI proposal seeks to improve coherence between geographic and thematic interventions by transferring 
most (global) thematic actions into (country- or region-based) geographic programmes.23 Despite the intention to 
shrink thematic programming, clarifications will be needed about how coherence will be achieved between peace 
and security interventions financed under bilateral and regional envelopes, on the one hand, and those facilitated 
by the Stability and Peace thematic programme, on the other.  
Moreover, while it makes sense to invest more in geographic programmes, given that these are closer to home 
(neighbourhood and Africa) and tailor-made, such an approach raises concerns about support for local-level actors. 
Since geographic programming and implementation take place via bilateral or regional cooperation, national gov-
ernments and public authorities will have to endorse the decentralisation of allocations to, for example, authorities, 
councils or civil society organisations at the local level. In countries mired in conflict, repression and authoritarian-
ism, this approach may prevent some local-level actors from having guaranteed access to EU support under the 
geographic pillar. 
4.1.3 Multi-lateral 
According to the Global Strategy, the integrated approach is multi-lateral in that it engages all players “present in a 
conflict and necessary for its resolution” and aims to partner “more systematically on the ground with regional and 
international organisations, bilateral donors and civil society” to achieve sustainable peace “through comprehensive 
agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships” (EEAS 2016: 29). 
Generally speaking, the NDICI regulation outlines that programming should take place in cooperation with partner 
countries or regions, and preferably through joint programming with EU member states. Joint programming with 
other donors and consultation with representatives of civil society and local authorities shall take place “where 
relevant” (EC 2018a: 33). More specifically, when drawing up programming documents with partner countries and 
regions afflicted by conflict and crisis, the proposal (ibid.: 34) stipulates that “due account shall be taken of the 
special needs and circumstances of the countries or regions concerned”, and that “special emphasis shall be placed 
on stepping up coordination amongst all relevant actors to help the transition from an emergency situation to the 
development phase.”  
The proposal remains vague, however, as to with whom and how financial coordination will be consolidated in 
conflict zones. For example, there is no explicit mention of joint programming or co-financing with the UN even 
                                                     
23 A key motivation for bringing the NDICI into existence was to improve coherence between geographic and thematic inter-
ventions. In today’s budget, there has been overlap and inconsistent responses at the country level due to missing synergies 
between (country- and region-based) geographic and (global) thematic financial instruments. Therefore, the NDICI proposes 
to transfer a number of thematic actions to the geographic programmes, with the latter now representing three-quarters of the 
instrument. The remaining thematic actions (only 8% of the NDICI) would then cover those issues that are better dealt with at 
the global rather than the country/region level. 
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though the latter is the EU’s core strategic partner in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding (Debuysere 
and Blockmans 2019). 
Vagueness about “effective multilateralism” also predominates at an inter- and intra-institutional EU level. A truly 
integrated approach to conflict and crisis will require increased coordination both within the Commission (e.g. in the 
Commissioners’ Group on External Action) (Blockmans and Russack 2015), the Council (among all relevant work-
ing parties) and the Parliament (between the AFET and DEVE committees, in particular), as well as among these 
institutions. However, at one point in the process, attempts to move the management of external financing instru-
ments (e.g. the NDICI) from different line DGs and the FPI service (co-located in the EEAS) to DG DEVCO were 
interpreted as signalling an intended concentration of power of the purse, which is anathema to the philosophy of 
multilateralism within the EU’s own apparatus.24 
 
4.1.4 Multi-phased 
According to the Global Strategy, the integrated approach is multi-phased in that it allows the EU to act “at all stages 
of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in 
stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts” (EEAS 2016: 9–10). 
Under its different pillars, the NDICI provides financial assistance for all phases of the conflict cycle (Table 4). 
However, given that the NDICI is to be employed in a flexible manner in line with policy priorities, some phases of 
the conflict cycle risk being gradually overlooked in favour of quick responses to unforeseeable challenges and 
crises. As such, short-term foreign policy interests (e.g. stopping migration flows) may trump longer-term preventive 
approaches to conflict.25 Further clarification regarding the flexible short-, medium- and long-term deployment and 
impact of, in particular, the rapid response pillar and the emergency cushion (Table 2) is therefore imperative.  
At the intersection of a multi-lateral and -phased approach to conflict and crisis lies a difficult balancing act of 
reconciling complex ‘multi-lateral’ coordination with the need for responsive crisis intervention. While the rapid re-
sponse pillar and the emergency cushion do not require time-consuming programming, clarification is needed on 
how swift coordination among key EU players (e.g. DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and the EU delegations) and non-EU 
players (e.g. the UN, NATO and the OSCE) will take place under these two envelopes in order to avoid increasing 
delays in responding appropriately and decisively to crisis situations. 
                                                     
24 Insight gleaned from interviews with current and former EU officials. 
25 An additional question to be asked is how existing Trust Funds will relate to the NDICI. 
page 40 | Europe´s Coherence Gap in External Crisis and Conflict Management 
 
Table 4: Funding specifically allocated for issues relating to ‘Conflict, Peace and Stability’ under the NDICI 
Specific ‘Conflict, Peace and Stability’ actions under the NDICI 
Geographic Programmes  
= one out of five pillars within the geographic programmes specifically tackles  
Peace cooperation (i.e. Security, Stability and Peace) in all 4 designated regions 
(Neighbourhood, sub-Sahara Africa, Asia and the Pacific, the Americas and 
Caribbean) 
- People 
- Planet 
- Prosperity 
- Peace including resilience-building, conflict prevention, early warning, 
peacebuilding, SSR support, capacity-building of military actors (CBSD), 
countering radicalisation, etc. 
- Partnership 
Unclear what share  
of the overall  
€68,000 million of  
the budget for geo-
graphic programmes 
will  
be used for the  
‘Peace’ pillar 
Thematic Programmes 
= one of the four thematic pillars deals with ‘Stability and Peace’ 
- Human Rights and Democracy  
- Civil Society Organisations  
- Stability and Peace26 includes (1) assistance for conflict prevention, 
peacebuilding and crisis preparedness and (2) addressing global and 
trans-regional threats and emerging threats 
- Global Challenges 
€1,000 million of the 
overall €7,000 million 
is ring-fenced for 
‘Stability and Peace’ 
Rapid Response Pillar 
= quick responses, including (1) actions contributing to stability and conflict pre-
vention in situations of urgency, emerging crisis, crisis and post-crisis; (2) 
actions contributing to resilience-building and the humanitarian-development 
nexus; and  
(3) actions addressing foreign policy needs and priorities 
Unclear what share  
of the overall  
€4,000 million will go 
to which phase of the 
conflict cycle 
Emerging Challenges and Priorities Cushion 
= to be decided 
The €10,200 million 
is unallocated to en-
sure flexibility 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on the Commission’s proposal (EC 2018a).
 
4.1.5 Towards an integrated financial instrument? 
Looking at it from the angle of an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, there lies a paradox at the heart of the 
current NDICI proposal. On the one hand, by streamlining all instruments into a single flexible instrument, there is 
a risk that certain conflict dimensions, levels or phases will outweigh others, such as if there is political pressure to 
                                                     
26 Likely to be renamed ‘Conflict Prevention, Stability and Peacebuilding’. 
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serve the EU’s direct internal and external interests. As such, a joint instrument risks undermining a truly holistic 
approach.  
On the other hand, however, an integrated financial approach would likewise be undermined if the solution to this 
problem is to install excessive ring-fencing within the NDICI, thereby nullifying the philosophy of integration in the 
process. A difficult balance between merging instruments and preserving comprehensive action needs to be struck 
if the NDICI is to facilitate a genuine, rather than a merely cosmetic, integrated approach to conflict and crisis. 
Indeed, simplification is the hardest thing to do.  
Yet despite the fact that the NDICI embodies the rationale of an integrated approach, the instrument may well be 
pulled apart by the future European Development Fund and the European Neighbourhood Instrument owing to a 
political decision late in the process. If so, this would indicate that, despite commitments and logic, more specialist 
interests sometimes run counter (and powerfully so) to achieving integrated action. 
4.2 Other WGA instruments and procedures  
4.2.1 Lessons learned processes 
The ‘Concepts, Knowledge Management and Training’ division of the new Dir. ISP seeks to boost a process of 
lessons learned. What is new about this procedure is that it will try to look at the EU’s overall performance in a 
conflict zone. Rather than learning lessons about a certain aspect of EU intervention – as currently conducted by, 
e.g., DEVCO for development and the FPI service for financial instruments in external action – Dir. ISP.1 hopes to 
set up lessons learned processes in an integrated manner (interview EEAS, May 2019). 
If it succeeds, this form of knowledge management will help to set up feedback loops, as the lessons learned will 
be used to impact the planning and training activities of Dir. ISP itself. However, it remains to be seen whether 
ISP.1 will manage to implement this kind of more integrated lessons learned procedure about the EU’s overall 
performance. The fact is that ISP.1 lacks sufficient staff to execute this process properly, and that conducting these 
type of assessments may also not be appreciated across the board, as they are likely to identify structural failures 
(interview EEAS, May 2019). 
 
4.2.2 Joint programming  
For the next legislature, the EU is seeking to step up its own ‘joint programming’ in development cooperation,27 
which means the joint planning, analysis and response efforts (in short, a joint strategy) by all relevant EU partners. 
While still under negotiation, development programming in the next MFF is supposed to happen in an even more 
                                                     
27 The term ‘joint programming’ traditionally refers to working with member states. What is interesting is that the Commission 
text on the NDICI regulation makes joint programming ‘the default’. Indeed, in the preparatory work on strategic programming 
in 2019, EU delegations have also been asked to look at the feasibility of joint programming in every setting (Medinilla, Veron 
and Mazzara 2019). 
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integrated manner involving DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, the EEAS and the member states (interview DG DEVCO, 
April 2019). Indeed, there is an increased focus on joint programming with the EU member states in the Commission 
proposal on a new jumbo instrument for external action (EC 2018a; see Chapter 4.1).  
 
4.2.3 Information-sharing and shared analysis 
Important for a successful IA is to enhance information- and analysis-sharing among the various actors involved in 
crisis response in order to facilitate the implementation of a joint conflict response (Figure 3). The first implementa-
tion report of the IA, which has since been issued on an annual basis, outlines that the EU institutions are improving 
shared conflict analysis with member states and other stakeholders (EEAS 2017). The work being done by Dir. ISP 
to foster a shared understanding and analysis of a given conflict is particularly appreciated by various Commission 
DGs (interview DG ECHO, May 2019). They believe that different actors can provide different perspectives on a 
conflict or crisis with, for example, DG DEVCO (which often operates only in the capital of third countries) and DG 
ECHO (which also operates outside the capital) providing complementary analysis.  
 
Figure 3: Increasing integration (Source: EEAS 2019) 
 
One concrete example of information-sharing and shared analysis are the country reports that are drafted during 
country meetings, which bring together all stakeholders that work on a particular country. While the EEAS is the 
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penholder in this exercise, other actors (e.g. PSC and DEVCO) also contribute to this shared analysis as seen from 
different perspectives, such as by taking the theatre or the conflict as the subject rather than EU policies or institu-
tions.  
Another concrete example of shared analysis is the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA). If there is an 
emerging crisis, the PSC can ask the geographical desks within the EEAS to prepare a PCFA based on close 
consultation with the member states and the Commission. This PCFA provides a strategic analysis of a given crisis 
situation and outlines the available options for EU action, including a CSDP mission. While useful as an inter-
service tool for joint analysis, the EU should promote greater use of the PFCA in its processes for dealing with crisis 
situations (interview European Commission, May 2019). 
4.2.4 Human resources 
Human resources (HR) do not necessarily facilitate or reflect the importance of an IA to external conflicts and crises. 
In fact, a widespread sentiment within the institutions is that in order to write policy at the EU level, one needs to 
work together by default. In this sense, an IA is inevitable and an HR policy is not the core driver behind cooperation 
or coordination among services (interview EEAS, April 2019). Nonetheless, some interviewees have identified HR 
as one realm in which there is major scope for improvement in the belief that fostering incentives could enhance 
the services’ performance in working in an integrated manner. 
Specialised staff and resources 
Dir. ISP brings together up to 90 staff members who specialise in implementing and coordinating the EU’s IA. The 
increased staff capacity shows the importance attributed to implementing and operationalising the IA. Yet, for other 
staff at the EEAS and in other institutions, the IA is not mentioned as a core objective of the job mandate, nor are 
cooperation and coordination being sufficiently assessed during annual appraisal talks.  
It is clear that individual personalities matter for the implementation of an IA, as some are more likely to implement 
an IA than others. For example, some important drivers of the IA concept within Dir. ISP come from the UN and 
have brought with them certain ideas and expertise in the realm of policy and institutional integration (interview 
UNLOPS, May 2019). 
WGA trainings 
Some training schemes exist that seek to foster exchange among different EU institutions and bodies.  
- While new EEAS staff gets a four-day training to learn about the different parts of the house, this is not 
necessarily done with the motivation of fostering an integrated approach (interview HR, May 2019). 
- While not obligatory for all EEAS staff, personnel that specifically work on topics relating to crisis and conflict 
have a chance to take part in both trainings and conferences that deal with the EU’s IA (interview EEAS, 
May 2019).  
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- There are also in-house non-mandatory trainings for Commission staff that focus on conflict analysis and 
conflict sensitivity, of which an IA is one aspect (interview DG DEVCO, April 2019). 
- DG DEVCO organises CSDP pre-deployment trainings for staff members who are about to leave for a dele-
gation. Among other things, these trainings discuss the integrated approach to conflict and crisis (interview 
DG DEVCO, April 2019).  
- There is a voluntary ‘twinning’ training scheme between the European Parliament and the EEAS (interview 
EP, April 2019). Members of staff in the EP can spend up to three weeks at the EEAS or in a delegation to 
learn the ins and outs of these services. 
- In 2019, the EEAS developed a toolkit for strategic programming that includes a one-day specialist training 
for staff across the service, though it is primarily aimed at geographic desks. The rationale was to prepare 
strategically for the programming of the NDICI, including the pre-programming process of developing country 
assessments.28 
 
4.2.5 Political leadership 
Political leadership is key when trying to implement an IA. There has been massive improvement in inter-institu-
tional coordination in the last six years. One key factor behind this has been the leadership shown by Commission 
President Juncker and HRVP Mogherini (Interview EC SecGen, May 2019). In contrast to their respective prede-
cessors, José Manuel Barroso and Catherine Ashton, who 
were reluctant to work in an integrated manner, Juncker 
and Mogherini have facilitated and encouraged inter-insti-
tutional cooperation. In a similar vein, one expects HRVP 
Josep Borrell and European Council President Charles 
Michel to cooperate better than their predecessors. After all, heads of state or government play an important role 
in foreign affairs, especially when acting in crisis mode in the European Council. Since the staff of the European 
Council’s president is spread too thinly, it requires the preparatory support of the EEAS. 
Furthermore, at a more micro-level, leadership can also facilitate an IA. For one thing, having heads of units and 
DGs rotate among different services and institutions can help to foster better inter- and intra-service cooperation. 
For example, when DG DEVCO got a new DG who had previously worked at the EEAS, he managed to push for 
more and better cooperation with the EEAS (Interview DG DEVCO, April 2019). Similarly, effective rotation between 
the EEAS and its stakeholders – especially the member states – will be key to a better functioning of the EEAS as 
well as the success of the IA.
                                                     
28 Insight taken from an email exchange with Andrew Sherriff on 4 October 2019. 
Political leadership is key when trying to 
implement an IA. There has been massive 
improvement in inter-institutional coordi-
nation in the last six years. 
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5 Conclusion 
Conceptually, over the past decade, the EU has been elaborating and deepening its WGA to external crises and 
conflicts. By gradually developing an integrated approach based on the security-development nexus (2003) into a 
‘comprehensive approach’ (CA) (in 2013) and a more holistic ‘integrated approach’ (IA) (in 2016), the scope of the 
EU’s so-called ‘whole-of-governance approach’ (WGA) – as opposed to the ‘whole-of-government approaches’ 
(WGAs) of the member states – has ambitiously expanded. While designing this approach, the EU has learned 
from and exchanged with other multilateral actors (the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the OECD-DA and civil society), 
which in turn has led to a gradual conceptual convergence of all these actors’ headquarters-level approaches to 
dealing with external conflicts and crises. 
Today, the EU’s IA aims to address all conflict dimensions – ranging from security challenges to development 
concerns to economic grievances – during all phases of a conflict, from prevention to post-conflict rehabilitation. To 
effectively implement such an approach, the EU wishes to coordinate and cooperate with all relevant actors at the 
local, national, regional and global levels.  
Indeed, the EU’s IA is system-wide in that it builds on various EU policies and instruments, including humanitarian 
aid, political dialogue, sanctions, CSDP, development cooperation, macro-financial assistance and trade (EEAS 
2019). While the EU’s core interests in terms of external conflict management lie in its extended neighbourhood, 
the IA is applied much more broadly and spans the entire globe, including when tackling conflicts in the Sahel 
(especially in Mali and Niger), the Horn of Africa (mainly Somalia), South-east Asia (notably Myanmar) and Latin 
America (Venezuela). 
In order to operationalise its ambitious WGA policy, several platforms and mechanisms have been put in place to 
enable actors to interact and coordinate. The key player and facilitator of the EU’s IA is the EEAS’ new Directorate 
Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (Dir. ISP), which was founded in March 2019 to regroup the former 
division for the Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and 
Mediation (PRISM) and the security/defence policy, planning and conduct parts of the house. In addition to conflict 
and crisis coordination by Dir. ISP, there are numerous inter-service platforms (e.g. crisis meeting and the Com-
missioners Group on External Action) and multi-lateral platforms that facilitate a joint crisis response of the 
HRVP/EEAS, the Commission’s DGs, the Political Security Committee and other international actors. However, 
despited playing an interesting political role in the realm of conflict mediation, the European Parliament is generally 
not involved in inter-service coordination.  
The latter is emblematic of one core challenge that hampers the establishment of a truly effective IA at the EU level: 
the remaining gaps between the political and operational dimensions in responding to external conflicts and crises. 
For instance, while the divisions of the EEAS with a conduct function in civ-mil security and defence cooperation 
have been merged into Dir. ISP, the geographical directorates under the Deputy Secretary General for political 
affairs remain largely detached and member states are not fully integrated into their activities. As a result, although 
the Dir. ISP may trigger integrated action at the bureaucratic level, it will not necessarily do so at the political and 
operational levels.  
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At a more technical-operational level, one key innovation that may enhance the implementation of an IA to crisis 
response is the NDICI, the jumbo financial instrument that has been proposed by the Commission for the next MFF. 
However, the intention to merge finances for development, international cooperation and the neighbourhood also 
lays bare one key paradox: While the NDICI has the ability to facilitate coordinated financial action, there is also a 
risk that it will actually undermine comprehensive action, as some conflict dimensions, levels or phases may out-
weigh others within the same instrument under political pressure of serving the EU’s direct interests.  
While it still remains to be seen whether the merging of financial instruments will be a success factor for an IA at 
the EU level, the importance of political leadership in encouraging cooperation and coordination unquestionably is. 
The cooperation of the HRVP with both the Commission president and the president of the European Council 
cannot be underestimated in this regard. Moreover, investing in human resources is important to facilitate an IA – 
and personalities matter. While specialised staff has been hired in Dir. ISP to operationalise an IA, more could be 
done to create the right incentives for people to work together within and across EU services and institutions.
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6 End note 
This report was written in the framework of the research project “Europe's coherence gap in external crisis and 
conflict management: Political rhetoric and institutional practice in the EU and its member states”. In this project, 
the Bertelsmann Stiftung and Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) have joined forces to assess whether, 
how and with what degree of success whole-of-government approaches (WGAs) are being implemented in the 
external actions of the EU and its member states. The underlying interest was to find out whether WGAs have, as 
intended, led to more political coherence. 
WGAs in foreign affairs were introduced to cope with the changing security environment after the end of the Cold 
War. They refer to the fact that (re-)emerging conflicts and crises, especially those associated with fragile or pre-
carious statehood, have become multi-dimensional, involving different root causes and going beyond the traditional 
nexus between security and development. Hence, in order to successfully tackle and address these complex con-
tingencies, a whole toolbox of defence, diplomacy and development instruments has become necessary. To employ 
this toolbox, cooperation with multiple actors at different levels (local, national, regional) is required throughout all 
phases of the conflict cycle (prevention, crisis management, stabilization, reconstruction and state-building). A 
WGA thus refers to a holistic and integrated government response to tackling fragility and conflict.  
The results of this research will be published as an anthology in early 2020. The book will contain an abridged 
version of the present EU study and 28 country reports, each examining whether and how the WGA policy of the 
respective member state was institutionally implemented. 
We thank both authors Loes Debuysere, Researcher, and Steven Blockmans, Senior Research Fellow and Head 
of EU Foreign Policy Unit, of CEPS for their outstanding work. 
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